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Taking Coase Seriously:
Neil Komesar on Law's Limits
Daniel H. Cole
NEIL

K. KOMESAR, Law's Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand
of Rights. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Pp. 216. $65.

Neil Komesar is one of the few legal scholars who has taken seriously
Ronald Coase's call for comparative institutional analyses to comprehend
and resolve problems of social cost. In his 1994 book, Imperfect Alternatives,
Komesar explained why there is no first-best set of legal and economic
institutions and organizations for avoiding or resolving social conflicts,
elaborated a framework for analyzing institutional choice, and applied that
framework to issues in tort law and constitutional law, including the scope
of judicial review. In his new book, Law's Limits, Komesar further develops
two principal features of the framework from Imperfect Alternatives: the
"two-force model" of politics, with majoritarian and minoritarian biases as
twin sources of political malfunction, and the premise of cross-institutional
complexity, according to which increasing numbers and complexity similarly hamper all alternative institutional arrangements, greatly complicating
institutional-choice decisions. Komesar applies his model in Law's Limits to
current social conflicts between private property owners and public land-use
planners. Some of his institutional-policy conclusions might well startle his
fellow law and economics scholars.
COASE AND COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Komesar's analytical approach is truly Coasean, which is not to say
common. Ronald Coase may be one of the most oft-cited scholars of the
Daniel H. Cole is R. Bruce Townsend Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law at Indianapolis. I am grateful to Howard Erlanger, Andy Klein, and Mark Rosen for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
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past half century, but his influence on method has been surprisingly limited.
Few economists or legal scholars engage in the analytical enterprise Coase
has championed: comparative institutional analysis.
Coase (1964) has written that all of society's mechanisms for organizing socioeconomic relations, including markets, firms, and governments, are
"more or less failures." They fail in different ways, to different extents, in
different circumstances. Given this differential failure, what we require,
when confronted with problems of social cost, is comparative institutional
analysis. Specifically, we should compare the costs and benefits of various
market, firm, and governmental solutions. In Coase's words, "we have to
take into account the costs involved in operating the various social
arrangements (whether it be the working of the market or of a governmental department) as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system. In
devising and choosing among social arrangements we should have regard for
the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am
advocating" (1960, reprinted in Coase 1988, 156).
Coase was hardly the first social scientist to call for comparative
institutional analysis of social problems and solutions. The "old institutional" economists did so during the first half of the twentieth century (see
Mercuro and Medema 1997, chap. 4; Hovenkamp 1990, 1014-31). But they
lacked an objective basis for comparing institutional and organizational
alternatives. They could demonstrate different efficient equilibria under
varying institutional, organizational, and distributional assumptions, but
they provided no theory or metric for choosing between alternative
institutional and organizational arrangements. As Coase (1984, 230) has
written, the old institutionalists amassed mountains of data "waiting for a
theory, or a fire."
Coase enabled the switch from old institutionalism to the new
institutional economics by providing the metric of transaction costs, which
positively explained and normatively prescribed institutional and organizational choices: That institutional and organizational structure is best that,
under the circumstances, minimizes on transaction costs in order to
maximize the social product (or social welfare) (see Coase 1960, reprinted
in Coase 1988, 115-19 and 154-56).
It is, of course, possible to disagree with Coase's normative goal of
maximizing the social product, but law and economics scholars would hardly
be inclined to do so. Nevertheless, many of them simply ignore Coase's call to
comparative institutional analysis. What one finds in the literature, generally
speaking, are articles that either (1) identify some market failure and
recommend a government (regulatory or tax-based) solution without consideration for potential government failure or (2) identify some government
failure but fail to demonstrate that the price mechanism of the market would
operate more efficiently overall.
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The failure of law and economics scholars to follow Coase's call for
comparative institutional analysis may be symptomatic of a more general
disconnect between Coase and the Coaseans, which Simon Johnson and
Andrei Schleifer (1999) have observed. It may also be the case that Coase
has not been read so widely or carefully as the frequency of citations to his
works in the literature might lead one to believe. Law and economics
scholars have built sizeable reputations by theorizing (and mathematizing)
about economically optimal legal solutions in the first-best world of the socalled Coase Theorem-a world that, according to Coase (1988, 15), is
hardly worth studying. In that mythical world, all forms of social organization would be equally and optimally efficient; no problems of social cost
would arise to study or resolve.
However, a small but growing number of economists, legal scholars,
and other social scientists have become actively engaged in the kind of
research Coase suggested is necessary to achieve progress in understanding
and ordering socioeconomic relations. In 1997, Coase and his fellow Nobel
laureate Douglass North founded the International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE) to facilitate and promote such research. Today,
ISNIE numbers several hundred members from countries throughout the
world. But one does not have to belong to ISNIE to engage in Coasean
comparative institutional analysis, as Neil Komesar ably demonstrates in
Law's Limits.

KOMESAR'S APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Terminological and Methodological Issues
Before addressing Komesar's analytical framework, it is worth clarifying
some terminological differences between Komesar's approach and conventional usages in the ISNIE literature. First and foremost, Komesar does not
mean quite the same thing by "comparative institutional analysis" as
Douglass North and most other ISNIE scholars. This is not to say that
one is correct and the other incorrect-definitions are matters of convention-but a failure to clarify the differences could result in misunderstandings and false disagreements.
North uses the term institutions to refer the "rules of the game in a
society, or more formally .... the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction." These include both "formal constraints-such as rules
that human beings devise" and "informal constraints-such as conventions
and codes of behavior" (1990, 3-4). Courts and legislatures, in North's
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terminology, are not institutions but organizations.' Komesar, by contrast,
defines institutions as decision-making processes,
which includes courts and
2
legislatures, but excludes the rules themselves.
Komesar's methodology also differs in interesting ways from those of
Coase and other ISNIE scholars. Specifically, Komesar's institutional choice
set of markets, courts, or legislatures differs from Coase's institutional choice
set of markets, firms, or government. Coase generally combines courts and
legislative bodies under the rubric of government, while distinguishing
carefully between markets and firms-that distinction constituting the very
reason for Coase's initial exploration in transaction-cost analysis. 3 Komesar,
by contrast, treats courts and legislatures as importantly different social
institutions-the first, legal, and the second, political; but he makes no
distinction between firms and markets.
Coase's and Komesar's institutional choice sets might be usefully
combined to create a broader choice set containing the following four
institutions: (1) markets, (2) firms, (3) courts, and (4) legislatures. If our goal
is to develop a truly comprehensive institutional choice set, we would need to
incorporate other social institutions, such as families, clubs, and churches, all
of which play a role in allocating resources and resolving disputes.
Be that as it may, nothing is inherently wrong about limiting the
institutional choice set as both Komesar and Coase do. For the most part, it
simply reflects the topics in which they are most interested. Coase's
institutional choice set, in part, reflects his intense interest in explaining
the existence of business firms. With respect to the issues in which Komesar
is most interested-land-use planning and regulatory takings-there seems
little reason to expect that a distinction between markets and firms as
institutions would be very significant; likewise, family, club, and religious
institutions or organizations.
1. According to Masashiko Aoki (2001, 22), North excludes organizations from his
definition of institutions for functional reasons: His goal is to understand the roles organizations play as agents of formal institutional change.
2. North and Komesar, between them, do not exhaust the alternative definitions of
institution. The economist Avner Greif (1994, 943), for example, defines institutions
inclusively to include both rules and the organizations that design, implement, and enforce
them. Another economist, Masashiko Aoki (2001, 26), defines an institution in gametheoretic terms as a Nash equilibrium: "An institution is a self-sustaining system of shared
beliefs about how the game is played. Its substance is a compressed representation of the
salient, invariant features of an equilibrium path, perceived by almost all the agents in the
domain as relevant to their own strategic choices. As such it governs the strategic interactions
of the agents in a self-enforcing manner and in turn is reproduced by their actual choices in a
continually changing environment."
3. Firms operate within markets, but they displace markets for various transactions. At
its essence, a firm is any organization with an employer, an employee, and a hierarchical
relationship between the two. Were markets always the cheapest mechanism for organizing
economic activity, there would be no employer/employee relations, only discrete, independent, per-transaction contracting. The very fact that firms--hierarchically organized
combinations of employers and employees-exist suggests that markets are not always the
cheapest way to organize economic activity. See Coase (1937, reprinted in Coase 1988).
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Building on Coase's Model
Komesar's comparative institutional analysis stems from Coase's (1964)
observation that all forms of social organization are subject to failure. Also
like Coase, Komesar's approach is fundamentally economic, for the reason
that economic theory-in particular, Coasean transaction-cost theory"provides a powerful analytical framework with which to organize analysis
of law and public policy" (p. 181). In addition, although Komesar does not
make this point, Coase's analytical approach allows us to make institutional
choices even in the absence of an agreed-upon metric for determining social
welfare because its focus is not on maximizing social welfare per se but on
minimizing more easily measured social costs of legal conflicts. 4 By minimizing social costs, Coase presumes, we maximize the social product, which
he treats as a proxy (however imperfect) for social welfare. In many other
respects, however, Komesar's approach to comparative institutional analysis
is more nuanced than Coase's.
In Coase's view, certain institutional arrangements simply work better
than alternative institutional arrangements, depending on the circumstances. When the cost of using the price mechanism is low, the market
(a nonhierarchical institution populated by independent contractors) allocates resources more efficiently than firms (hierarchical organizations
comprised of employers and employees or, more typically these days,
management, labor, and shareholders) or governments (hierarchical organizations of elected political representatives and unelected bureaucrats).
Coase explained why in his article "The Federal Communications Commission" (1959, 18):
an administrative agency which attempts to perform the function
normally carried out by the pricing mechanism operates under two
handicaps. First of all, it lacks the precise monetary measure of benefit
and cost provided by the market. Second, it cannot, by the nature of
things, be in possession of all the relevant information possessed by the
managers of every business which uses or might use radio frequencies, to
say nothing of the preferences of consumers for the various goods and
services in the production of which radio frequencies could be used.
In other cases, it is evidently cheaper to organize economic activities in
firms rather than through discrete market transactions. As Coase explained
in his landmark 1937 article, "The Nature of the Firm" (reprinted in Coase
1988, 40):
4. On the theoretical impossibility of specifying, with certainty, a social-welfare
function, see Arrow ([1951] 1970). Throughout "The Problem of Social Cost," Coase (1960)
assumes the normative goal of maximizing the social product. The social product, thus,
becomes a proxy for social welfare. But near the end of the article, Coase (1960, reprinted in
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the operation of the market costs something and .... by forming an
organization and allowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct
the resources, certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has
to carry out his function at less cost, taking into account the fact that
he may get factors of production at lower price than the market
transactions which he supercedes, because it is always possible to revert
to the open market if he fails to do this.
In still other cases, the government can be expected to provide the leastcostly resource allocation mechanism. In "The Problem of Social Cost"
(1960, reprinted in Coase 1988, 118), Coase wrote:
there is no reason why, on occasion .... governmental administrative
regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency.
This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with
the smoke nuisance, a large number of people is involved and when
therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the
firm may be high.
For Coase, the variables involved in institutional-choice determinations are few and presumably simple to evaluate. Governmental/administrative allocations tend to be preferable in social-cost situations involving
high numbers of parties. In most other cases, firms or markets tend to be
preferable. The choice between firms and markets would be based on which
institution would, under the circumstances, organize economic relations at
lowest cost. If the price mechanism is the cheapest allocation mechanism,
firms will either not form in the first place or will fail. Throughout his
comparative institutional analyses, Coase seems to assume that various
institutional alternatives respond differently as circumstances-complexity
and numbers-change.
It is in this respect that Komesar most clearly expands and improves on
Coase's model. Komesar (p. 23) suggests that issues of institutional choice
are more complicated than Coase imagines, because "institutions tend to move
together" (italics in original). That is to say, all institutional alternativesmarkets, courts, politics-function better in cases of low complexity
involving fewer parties. 5 By the same token, they each function more
poorly as numbers and complexity rise. Expressed in economic terms, our
alternative social institutions all suffer from diseconomies of scale. For this
reason, the process of institutional choice truly becomes a search for least
bad outcomes (for society as a whole).
Coase 1988, 154) notes that "the choice among different social arrangements for the solution
of economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than this and that the total
effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account."
5. Indeed, in cases involving low numbers and complexity, "we will often have the
pleasant task of choosing the best of good or attractive alternatives" (p. 24).
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Coase, as we have already seen, recognized that market allocation may
be more costly than government/administrative allocation in cases, such as
air pollution, involving large numbers of parties. Komesar, in turn, notes that:
As with the market, the courts' ability decreases as the number of
parties and the complexity of the issues increases. As the number of
potential plaintiffs and defendants increases, the costs of bringing
actions increase and the dynamics of litigation become more complex.
Larger numbers of parties mean higher litigation costs such as service of
process, notice of motions, depositions, and other forms of trial preparation. Larger numbers also mean that negotiations over settlement
are more complicated and less likely to reach a value-enhancing result.
The problems of collective action that plague market transactions as
numbers increase also plague adjudication: larger numbers mean more
hold-outs and greater likelihood of a failed settlement. (P. 21)
The political process, too, becomes increasingly prone to failure as
numbers and complexity increase:
On the simplest level, time and other resources are needed to
investigate, legislate, and implement. The more complex the issue and
the larger the number of people involved, the higher these costs. More
important, the large numbers, great complexity, and widely dispersed
stakes associated with [highly complex issues involving large numbers
of parties such as] regional air pollution cause problems for the political
process by distorting the political participation of various constituent
interests in such activities as lobbying and voting. These distortions
of the political process are dramatic enough to be captured in two
traditional but polar opposite perceptions of political malfunctionminoritarian bias, which is the over representation of concentrated
interests (special interest legislation), and majoritarian bias, which is
the over representation of dispersed larger interests (the tyranny of the
majority). (P. 22)6
Komesar (p. 60) refers to these twin process problems as "the two-force
model of politics." Either bias, minoritarian or majoritarian, can cause the
political process to malfunction, so that it fails to maximize social welfare
(by minimizing social costs), just as markets and courts fail, when "numbers
and complexity increase and as the distribution of stakes becomes more
complex and more dispersed" (p. 22).
Komesar's "two-force model" of politics is both intuitive and useful,
but it requires a baseline of normal, functional legislation against which to
define "malfunctions" due to either minoritarian or majoritarian bias. If it is
6. Note that Komesar's definitions of majoritarian and minoritarian bias are representation centered, that is, based on those with voting rights in the specific jurisdiction.
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true, as James Madison ([17871, in Rossiter 1961) thought, that all
legislation is either minoritarian or majoritarian, then it would seem that
"malfunctions" are inherent to, and inevitable in, the political process.
Simply put, the political process always malfunctions because legislation is
always biased in favor of either the majority or some minority. Komesar is
able to avoid this unpalatable conclusion, however, by adopting an econoutilitarian baseline of "resource allocation efficiency." That is to say,
minoritarian and majoritarian biases, however inevitable, only cause political malfunctions when they result in socially inefficient allocations of
resources. A political resource allocation (or reallocation), even if it is
biased in favor of the majority or some minority, will not constitute a
"malfunction" if it results in an efficient (or more efficient) allocation of
society's resources.
But how can any institution-political, market, or judicial-be
comparatively efficient if, as Komesar maintains (p. 25), they all decline
in performance as numbers and complexity increase? Komesar has an
answer. Even though performance declines for all institutions in our choice
set, it might not decline at the same rate. If markets, for example, perform
worse at higher numbers and complexity, they may still perform relatively
better than courts or legislatures. The important point is that, as institutional performance declines at higher numbers and complexity, institutional choices become increasingly "close calls," and the process of
comparative institutional analysis becomes a far more subtle process than
Coase let on.
Among the three institutions-courts, legislative bodies, and markets-that make up his institutional-choice set, Komesar is concerned
(p. 3), first and foremost, with the courts and the adjudicative process. In
his model of institutional choice, the courts are the social institution
associated with law and the rule of law. Legal decisions are, by definition,
judicial. But courts do more than render legal decisions; they also decide
who decides. That is to say, they engage in their own form of comparative
institutional analysis, allocating social decision-making authority and responsibility among themselves, markets, and legislatures.
When the courts recognize "strong" property rights, which cannot be
violated without the consent of their owner, they are, in effect, allocating
resource allocation decisions to the market. A simple example of this kind
of judicial determination of the proper scope of market resource allocation is
trespass law. Trespass is a strict liability offense, for which the virtually
automatic remedy, at common law, is injunctive relief. The right to exclude,
which the law of trespass is designed to protect, constitutes a "strong"
property right. A trespasser cannot gain an entitlement to trespass across
another's property simply by agreeing to pay a court-ordered price, denominated as money damages. The only way for the trespasser to acquire an
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entitlement to cross the landowner's property is to purchase the right in a
free-market transaction.
In the same vein, and implicit in Komesar's analysis, whenever the
courts rule in favor of the defendant in a dispute over property rights, they
are, in effect, allocating the entitlement to the defendant and allocating to
the market any future change in the allocation of entitlements between the
defendant and the plaintiff. If the plaintiff seeks to have the entitlement
reallocated from the prevailing defendant to herself, she must resort to freemarket negotiations with the defendant.
When the courts recognize "weak" property rights-rights that are
enforceable not by injunctive relief but by money damages-they are
allocating the decision about who should control resources to themselves,
rather than the market. For example, in nuisance law one is entitled to
reasonably interfere with another's right to use and enjoy their land. The
determination of reasonableness is made by the courts, not by the market.
When the court deems a nuisance unreasonable, the nuisance creator is
generally allowed to continue interfering with the plaintiff landowner's use
and enjoyment of land, so long as she is willing to pay a court-determined,
rather than a free-market-determined, price, in the form of money damages.
The court, rather than the market, determines not only the allocation but
the value of entitlements.
Thus, when the court in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870,
871 (1970), refused to simply enjoin the defendant plant from emitting
cement dust that harmed neighboring residents, but instead gave the plant
the option of paying permanent damages, the court was allocating to itself,
rather than to the market, the determination of the value of the plaintiffs'
property rights. Moreover, the court in Boomer signaled that, for cases
involving large numbers of parties and technically complex matters such as
pollution, the political process should take precedence over both judicial
and market-based allocations of entitlements:
A court should not try to do this [solve air pollution problems/
conflicts] on its own as a by-product of private litigation and it seems
manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the
limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay
down and implement an effective policy for the elimination of air
pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of one private law
suit. It is the direct responsibility for government and should not thus be
undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between property owners
and a single cement plant-one of many-in the Hudson River Valley.
Similarly, in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120
(1991), the California Supreme Court held that whether an individual has
property rights in parts of their own body, which may be used for medical

269

270

LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY

research, is an issue best left for the legislature rather than the courts to
decide.
Interestingly, against the government itself-that is, when the government is a party in a property dispute-nearly all private property rights
are "weak" in Komesar's sense. Not only can the government take away
private property for public use pursuant to its power of eminent domain
(which literally means "highest ownership"), it can also regulate socially
harmful uses of private property, so long as those regulations do not go so far
as to constitute a "regulatory taking." Eminent-domain takings and legitimate police-power regulations both constitute nonmarket allocations of
rights and obligations; the only options available to a reviewing court, in
cases pitting the government against a private landowner, concern the
extent of its own participation. Whether, and the extent to which, courts
should intervene to delimit the political process in this arena becomes a
central question for Komesar's application of his analytical model, as we
shall see in the next section.
All this may appear as little more than an elaboration of the model first
developed by Calabresi and Melamed (1972). But Komesar goes beyond
Calabresi and Melamed's model in addressing the limitations of institutional
capacity. In particular, as Komesar explains (pp. 3-4, 26, 35-6, 163), courts
suffer from "supply" constraints that limit their ability to meet the "demand"
for judicially allocated entitlements, virtually forcing them to rule in ways
that allocate more entitlement-allocation decisions to markets or the
political process, which are alternative institutions with larger supply
capacities. Thus, as numbers and complexity rise, the role of the courts,
relative to the roles of markets and the political process, in allocating
entitlements should decline. This may be a source of frustration for lawyers
and other proponents of the rule of law, who recognize that courts are "most
needed where alternative decision makers such as political processes, markets, and informal communities work least well" (p. 3). But to focus only on
the desirability or demand for judicial intervention without a realistic
appraisal of the courts' own failings, including supply-side constraints, is
myopic-a failure of noncomparative, single-institutional analysis.

APPLYING THE MODEL: ZONING AND REGULATORY
TAKINGS LAW
Zoning
Zoning is a public, regulatory response to actual and potential land use
conflicts. But as with all governmental responses to market-related problems, the "solution" creates problems of its own, problems that in some
cases may render the cure worse than the disease. Two of the most common
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institutional problems associated with governmental land use planning are
exclusionary zoning, which is a problem of majoritarian bias, and domination of the process by local land developers, a problem of minoritarian bias.
The problem of minoritarian bias is exemplified in the famous case of
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, 264 Or. 574
(1973), in which a land developer successfully obtained from local zoning
authorities a change in zoning restrictions, so that it could build a mobile
home park in an area otherwise zoned single-family residential. The Oregon
Supreme Court overturned the rezoning, concluding that "special interests,
in the form of land developers, have disproportionate influence on the
rezoning process" through subversive practices such as "campaign contributions, lobbying, or even plain old bribery" (p. 58). Komesar (p. 61)
explains how minoritarian bias can arise:
the strength of minoritarian bias, most often associated with the
interest group theory of politics, lies in the distribution of the benefits
of political action. Interest groups with small numbers but high per
capita stakes have sizeable advantages in political action over interest
groups with larger numbers and smaller per capita stakes, because
higher per capita stakes mean that the members of the interest group
will have greater incentive to expend the effort necessary to recognize
and understand the issues. [By contrast, t]he per capita impact on each
member of the majority is just too low to justify the expenditure of
resources necessary to understand the issue involved. (Footnotes
omitted)
The opposite problem of majoritarian bias is exemplified by the case of
Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574
(N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
934 (1976), in which local land developers were not subversive "special
interests" but "victims" of a growth-control ordinance that greatly restricted
their livelihood in Petaluma. The ordinance was a popular measure designed
to protect Petaluma's "' small town character and surrounding open spaces.'
It benefited current residents/voters of Petaluma, but harmed both local
land developers/voters and potential residents/nonvoters. But how could
this happen, given the assumptions of the interest group theory of politics (a
subpart of the theory of collective action), which supposedly leads to
minoritarian bias in favor of land developers? Komesar explains that "the
prospect of majoritarian activity and influence and, therefore, the majority's
ability to offset minoritarian influence are determined by variation in the
same factors employed by the interest group theory of politics to generate its
conclusion of minoritarian dominance" (p. 62). Specifically, "as the absolute
per capita stakes for the majority increase (even holding constant the ratio
between majoritarian and minoritarian per capita stakes), members of the
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majority will more likely spend the resources and effort necessary to
understand an issue and recognize their interests" (emphasis in original).
The higher the stakes, the more likely the majority will seek to influence the
process to their own benefit.
These twin political malfunctions of minoritarian and majoritarian bias
create a demand, under the rule of law, for judicial control of the political
process. But as Komesar explains, the courts' role is not a simple one.
Because of the bifurcated nature of the problem, a judicial solution that
focuses on one source of malfunction, say minoritarian bias, may exacerbate
the other source of malfunction, majoritarian bias. Moreover, courts are
constrained by the supply-side problems discussed in the preceding section,
which prevent them from resolving all problems associated with a "highly
defective political process" (p. 71).
In Fasano, the court was clearly concerned about the prospect for
minoritarian bias in the administrative rezoning process. While acknowledging that "there is more reason to fear minoritarian bias at the less
observed, more complex administrative level than at the more exposed
(publicized) legislative level," Komesar identifies two problems with the
Fasano court's approach. "First, the subset of cases that would receive
Fasano-type judicial review may be neither small in number nor substantively simple." The demand may, therefore, outstrip the judiciary's ability to
supply legal rules to control minoritarian bias. Second, the court in Fasano
may have focused on the wrong bias. Even though minoritarian bias is
possible, it is more common in the context of "prototypical administrative
agencies-a regulatory agency at the federal or national level applying
complex legislation. But one view of administrative agencies does not fit
all." "In the context of local zoning, especially suburban local zoning of the
sort in Fasano, majoritarian bias, over representation of local homeowners,
and problems of over regulation are likely to be the major threats"
(pp. 72-75). 7 Thus, whatever developers gain through rezoning is likely
to be in the nature of a correction to the larger problem of majoritarian over
regulation (p. 115). Moreover, if zoning boards go too far in serving the
interests of developers, they are likely to be subject to "majoritarian
reaction" in the political process (p. 75).8
Even when courts focus on the correct form of political malfunction, as
the court appears to have done in the Petaluma case, the problem of
7. William Fischel (1985, 209) agrees with Komesar that majoritarian bias is the more
common form of political malfunction in suburban land use planning. Fischel (1985, 211-2 1)
further notes that minoritarianbias is more likely to be a significant problem in isolated small
cities, in "central cities," and where decisions are made by higher levels of government,
including the federal government.
8. Fischel (1985, 40) makes the same point: "If local officials offend enough owners and
users of land, they may be voted out of office and replaced by those more sympathetic to the goals
of their constituents." To this extent, at least, the political process itself provides a solution to
political malfunctions resulting from minoritarian bias.
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majoritarian bias can overwhelm the judiciary's ability to deal with it
effectively. As Komesar explains, "the severity of political malfunction that
motivates the substitution of the courts makes the task for the courts more
uncertain, expensive, and frustrating. Political jurisdictions subject to strong
majoritarian bias can be aggressively uncooperative. They make obtaining
compliance with court interventions difficult by every delaying and obfuscating tactic that they can employ" (p. 76). In sum, courts "face an
enormous strain on both their competence and their resources when they
attempt to replace a defective political process at high numbers and
complexity" (p. 84).
Komesar illustrates these problems with the famous Mount Laurel
cases. 9 In Mount Laurel I (South Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151 [1975], appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 [1975]),
the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned a local zoning ordinance that
had the effect of excluding moderate- and low-income residents. The
evidence showed that the ordinance was intended to maximize property
tax revenues while minimizing demand for expensive public services, such
as education. To that end, Mount Laurel's zoning plan provided for a good
deal of industrial and commercial development-the kind of development
that would support the township's tax base without demanding many public
services-but provided for virtually no housing for low-and moderateincome families, who typically demand sizeable public services but pay less
in property taxes. If the township succeeded in this effort to maximize
property tax revenues while minimizing the provision of new public
services, the primary beneficiaries would be existing residents-the majority. They would benefit from a relatively wealthy local government, with
more money to spend on existing schools-the schools their children
attended-and other public services for them, without competition from
new, undesirable residents. A clear enough case of majoritarian bias in land
use planning.
Just like the California court in Petaluma, the New Jersey court in
Mount Laurel I recognized the problem of majoritarian bias, and issued a
ruling that overturned it, with the presumed intention that Mount Laurel
would replace its exclusionary zoning ordinance with one that would be
fairer to unrepresented outsiders. But that's not what happened. Instead,
Mount Laurel township dragged its feet, and did not quickly (or even
slowly) amend its zoning ordinances to provide for more moderate- and lowincome housing. "It rezoned for low-cost housing three small, widely
scattered areas (less than .25 percent of its land) suffering from high noise
levels and proximity to industrial uses" (Dukeminier and Krier 2002, 1084).
Other New Jersey communities, with similar circumstances, also "fudged,
9. Komesar also mentions (p. 84), but does not discuss, 50-year-long efforts at school
desegregation.

273

274

LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY

changing their ordinances in such a way as to create the appearance, but not
the wood fiber in
the reality, of compliance." As Fischel has observed, "[i]f
all the books and papers written about the original Mount Laurel decision
were converted into construction materials, it would conceivably amount to
more low-income housing than was built as a result of the decision" (1985,
320).
After eight years, the South Burlington County NAACP took the
township back to court for Mount Laurel II (Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 [1983]). This confronted the New
Jersey Supreme Court with an important choice: It could either "abandon"
its project of institutionalizing inclusionary zoning "or increase its already
significant commitment to judicial review" (p. 83). It chose the latter option.
This time, the court, instead of simply dismantling exclusionary zoning
and leaving it to the local community to rezone in such a way as to provide
for low- and moderate-income housing, recognized the need for a stronger,
more active judicial role. Good faith efforts would not be enough. The court
ordered the township to provide its fair share of low- and moderate-income
housing, expressed in numerical units. More specifically, it had to undertake
affirmative measures to induce real estate developers to build low-cost
homes. This meant more than dismantling exclusionary zoning and other
government-imposed barriers; it meant replacing exclusionary zoning with
"inclusionary zoning" (Dukeminier and Krier 2002, 1085). Moreover, from
this point on, the judiciary announced, it would play a continuing and
active role in land use planning in Mount Laurel and other developing
townships to ensure that majoritarian bias would not derail its own inclusionary zoning policies.
But this high level of combined judicial activism and activity lasted
just three years, until the New Jersey legislature enacted a complex and
relatively weak (compared to the judicial remedies ordered in the two
Mount Laurel cases) response to exclusionary zoning practices. As Komesar
explains (2001 83-85), the New Jersey Fair Housing Act did not displace
the state supreme court's jurisdiction over Mount Laurel. And the court was
well aware that the legislation "remove[d] the teeth" from its efforts to
replace exclusionary zoning with inclusionary zoning. Nevertheless, the
court upheld the New Jersey Fair Housing Act as constitutional under the
state's constitution, and quietly retired from its activist role in countering
majoritarian bias in local land use planning. It has not since come out of
retirement even though the New Jersey Fair Housing Act has proved to be
almost completely ineffective in correcting the problem of exclusionary
zoning.
The lesson, for Komesar (p. 85), is that courts may not be institutionally well suited to "replace a defective political process at high numbers and
complexity." When they try, they face "an enormous strain on both their
competence and their resources," and with no assurance of successfully
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achieving their goals. It is precisely because "judicial review is a taxing
response to serious political malfunction" that courts tend to "offer little
serious review of land use regulation." It constitutes a tacit admission that
they possess neither the institutional capacity nor the resources to resolve
deep-rooted political problems.
This is not to say that the political process works well enough, in spite of
the malfunctions caused by minoritarian and, especially, majoritarian biases.
There is good reason to distrust the political process when these biases are
likely to be manifest-that is, in cases of high numbers and complexity. The
imperfections of the political process are serious and should be taken
seriously. But so should the courts' ability to deal with them effectively.
Supply-side and institutional-design features significantly constrain the
judiciary's ability to counter majoritarian bias in the political process.
Sometimes, as the New Jersey Supreme Court discovered in the Mount Laurel
cases, the best means-even if not a very good means-of dealing with the
majoritarian biases of local governments is another, higher political process,
which may be less prone to majoritarian bias or, at least, less prone to the
particular majoritarian biases manifested in the local government legislation.

Takings and Just Compensation
The problems for courts posed by regulatory takings turn out to be
quite similar to the problems created by political malfunctions in land use
planning. Regulatory takings law describes judicial efforts to enforce
constitutional property-rights protections against intended and unintended
depredations of government. The emergence of regulatory takings doctrine,
which did not exist in constitutional law prior to the twentieth century,
reflects growing judicial distrust of legislative motives. That distrust is
largely a consequence of the rise of the administrative state, which has
increasingly limited the rights of private landowners.
Judicial distrust of legislative motives, as an animating factor in
regulatory takings law, is plainly evident in statements made 70 years apart
by Supreme Court Justices Holmes and Scalia in two landmark regulatory
takings cases.
First, in 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 US 393, 415 (1922),
Justice Holmes virtually invented the doctrine of regulatory takings, out of
expressed concern that the state's police power-including its authority to
regulate uses of private property to prevent public nuisances-was subject to
majoritarian abuse: "When the seemingly absolute protection [of private
property] is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency
of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last
private property disappears." But Justice Holmes's distrust of legislative
motives was minor compared to the cynicism of his successor Justice
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Antonin Scalia, who in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1025 n.12 (1992), wrote that "[s]ince ... a [police power] justification
can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of
whether the legislature has a stupid staff." As I have written elsewhere
(Cole 2002, 158), the "unmistakable implication" of this statement is that
the government can be expected to avoid paying compensation by describing its action, whenever possible, as a police power regulation rather than
an eminent domain taking. This necessitates and justifies judicial intervention to counter the majoritarian bias and its negative effects on constitutionally protected property rights. In this circumstance, the relevant majority
are state or local voters who do not like the way an individual landowner or
certain categories of discrete landowners may be utilizing their properties.
The majority of voters may benefit from the exercise of the state's police
power, which curtails such undesirable utilizations; meanwhile, a minority of
discrete landowners is left to bear all the costs associated with being
prevented from using their land as they see fit.
Neil Komesar believes that there is "much to be said for an expansive
vision of the Taking Clause, in general, and of regulatory takings in
particular." It could, "provide a powerful antidote to malfunction in the
political process," as identified by Justices Holmes and Scalia. "But,"
Komesar goes on to note, "there are also costs" associated with judicial
activism designed to rein in "the excesses of land use regulation" (p. 91).
We must, once again, consider the institutional constraints that limit the
ability of courts to regulate the regulators.
Komesar conducts his comparative institutional analysis of regulatory
takings law largely in the context of critiquing the regulatory takings
jurisprudence of Richard Epstein (1985) and William Fischel (1995).
Epstein's famous (or infamous, depending on one's ideological perspective)
1985 book, Takings, argues that virtually any governmental interference with
exiting private property rights should require payment of just compensation
under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Epstein's view,
regulatory takings are largely a problem of political malfunction through
minoritarian bias (rent seeking): Special interests, that is, concentrated
minorities, seek to garner benefits (rents), while imposing costs on othersdiscrete landowners or even society as a whole-through the regulatory
process. Epstein would resolve this malfunction by requiring compensation
for virtually any regulatory imposition, including taxation, however minimal. The government need not take title, render the land valueless, or
physically invade the land; it just has to regulate or tax the land, or any other
property for that matter, in such a way as to reduce the owner's wealth
discernibly. Under this rule, virtually "all forms of regulation and taxation
would become presumptive takings" (p. 93, emphasis added).
It should be noted that Epstein would exempt from explicit compensation requirements any regulations that provide implicit compensation in
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the form of "reciprocal benefits" to the burdened landowner. Thus, if the
burdened landowner benefits (sufficiently) from similar and proportionate
burdens imposed on his neighbors, that may constitute sufficient in-kind
compensation (Epstein 1985, chap. 14). A good deal of land use regulation,
conceivably, could be imposed without explicit just-compensation payments under this formula. 10 From Komesar's perspective, however, Epstein's
"reciprocal benefits" exemption is precisely the sort of complicating factor
that would cause his proposed takings analysis to strain judicial resources to
the breaking point. It has the potential to raise enormously the administrative costs of resolving takings disputes.
Epstein's approach to regulatory takings has two chief problems,
according to Komesar: (1) It focuses on what is, in most cases, the wrong
political malfunction-minoritarian rather than majoritarian bias, and (2)
it fails to consider supply-side and other institutional constraints on the
courts' ability to effectively police the political process, even where constitutional rights are at issue.
Komesar reads Epstein as viewing the political malfunction associated
with regulatory takings largely in terms of minoritarian bias, but he
observes that the Fifth Amendment's just-compensation requirement
corrects for majoritarian, not minoritarian bias (pp. 94-95). If "concentrated minorities control the political process, the requirement of compensation will not correct the political malfunction and ensure the absence of
negative-sum regulation," because the compensation burden will be borne
ultimately by taxpayers-the majority-and not be the concentrated
minority that benefited from the regulation. Even worse, in Komesar's
view, requiring just compensation for regulations serving the interests of
concentrated minorities could exacerbate political malfunctions: "in the
presence of minoritarian bias, the availability of compensation may itself
create negative-sum, rent-seeking government" because "a massive compensation program" would entail "a complex administrative apparatus,"
which itself would "generate the distinct possibility of minoritarian bias.
Influential concentrated interests are likely to be overcompensated, while
those less well-heeled and well-connected are likely to be under compensated (p. 97).
To the extent Epstein is wrong about the nature of the political
malfunction associated with land use overregulation, and regulatory takings
are really a consequence of majoritarian rather than minoritarian bias, the
compensation requirement is far more useful. It internalizes to the majority
the costs of the regulatory measures from which they benefit, while
offsetting the harms imposed on discrete private landowners (assuming
the level of compensation is correct).
10. Fischel observes that "Imlodern growth controls have been shown to raise housing
prices both within communities and within entire metropolitan areas" (1985, 209).
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Epstein's analysis also ignores the supply-side constraints on the courts'
abilities to police the regulatory process effectively:
The amount and scope of judicial activity Epstein proposes violates
even the simplest senses of scale. Without regard to the competence of
the courts or the chance that they would make worse decisions than
even a rent-seeking, liberty-usurping political process, the range and
complexity of the issues that the courts must now consider would break
the judicial bank several times over. Whatever the evils of government
regulation or the goodness of judicial decision making, reallocating
such a mass of social decisions from the political to the adjudicative
process is impossible without a change in the size of the judiciary so
massive that it would alter the basic character of the judiciary. (P. 99)
Komesar correctly notes that Epstein's consideration of this problem is far
too simplistic. Epstein recognizes that such a problem could arise, but
predicts that it would be fleeting, as the government, responsible for
compensating for just about everything it does, would quickly dwindle to
a minimal size. But this is implausible where the judiciary is too small in the
first place to send the government the kind of price signals necessary to
cause a seismic shift from the welfare state to something resembling Robert
Nozick's (1974) night watchman state. Epstein also fails to account for the
potential political backlash against the courts that might ensue, if the
judiciary attempted to require the government to compensate for all manner
of popular, majoritarian regulation and taxation.
In contrast to Epstein, the economist William Fischel's (1995) account
of the regulatory process and the law of regulatory takings is more nuanced
and persuasive. It is also far less radical. In particular, Fischel envisions a
more restrained judicial role in land use regulation. Still, Komesar believes
that Fischel overestimates the role the courts can realistically play (p. 93).
Fischel's and Komesar's accounts of regulatory takings actually have a
good deal in common. Both focus on the political process and its malfunctions as the basis for regulatory takings law, both note that majoritarian bias
is the primary cause of political malfunction in takings cases, especially at
lower levels of government, and both observe that the nature and extent of
political malfunctions differ with the level and type of government
involved. The chief difference between them seems to be that Fischel does
not focus due attention on the courts' supply-side constraints.11 Consequently, he overestimates the ability of the courts to correct for political
11. Fischel (1995, 180) suggests that courts need to be sparing in their exercise of
judicial review, but not because of supply-side constraints; rather, they need to be careful
because "the legitimacy of judicial review in a democratic society is sufficiently limited that it
needs to conserve its resources." This implies that courts may well have an adequate supply of
judicial review, but that they should constrain themselves. Komesar argues, by contrast, that
the supply itself is strictly limited.
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malfunctions, even in the more limited range of cases he believes warrant
close judicial oversight.
Komesar and Fischel concur that judicial review should focus on
regulatory takings by local governments because political malfunctions at
the local level of government are more likely the result of majoritarian bias,
and the just-compensation requirement can correct that bias.1 2 They differ,
however, in their reasons for urging less judicial review of decisions taken by
higher governmental units. Komesar's reason is functional. He believes the
just-compensation requirement is less likely to serve its purpose at higher
levels of government-or even with respect to large, local governmentswhere political malfunctions are typically the result of minoritarian, rather
than majoritarian, bias. Fischel concurs in this functional reason for greater
judicial acquiescence in regulations issued by governments in larger jurisdictions, but he offers additional, institutional reasons with which Komesar
might not agree. For one thing, Fischel believes that landowners and those
with other economic interests are generally capable of protecting their
interests in the political process; they are not the kind of "discrete and
insular minorities" likely to be greatly harmed by majoritarian excesses:
"[E]conomic interest groups would be able to form alliances to protect
themselves from short-sighted populism." More contentiously, Fischel
argues that "[v]oters and representatives in large jurisdictions also are more
likely to be concerned with their reputation for fair dealings, since bad
reputations are apt to harm future generations" (1995, 180). This amounts
to a claim that governments in larger jurisdictions are inherently more
trustworthy than governments in smaller jurisdictions. Komesar doubts this
(p. 99 n.20). Yet, he might agree with Fischel's conclusion that, in many
circumstances, especially in larger jurisdictions, "political action, which is
often disparaged as rent-seeking, is sufficient to protect property without the
help of judges" (1995, 324). Fischel supports this conclusion by noting that
"it is not clear that property is less secure today than it was during the
Lochner era" (1995, 140). Even if that were not the case, Fischel doubts the
ability of judges to do a better, that is, more efficient, job than the political
process (1995, 317). This is certainly in accord with Komesar's arguments
about the comparative institutional disabilities of courts.
Komesar finds Fischel's approach to regulatory takings "more focused,
more sensible, and more thoughtful than Epstein's," but concludes that "it
still leaves the courts with an immense and difficult job. The problem is not
12. However, Fischel observes that, even in small jurisdictions, where majoritarian bias
is more likely to threaten the property rights of discrete minority groups and individuals, "the
external regulation does not always have to be the courts. If the resources subject to regulation
are portable, those regulated can threaten to move them beyond the reach of the regulation.
Such a threat can restrain even the most opportunistic local government" (1995, 132).
Komesar seems to agree with this point, noting, for example, that "competition among local
zoning jurisdictions ... should control both excessive exaction and excessive regulation"
(p. 117).
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one of legitimacy and it cannot be solved by the distinction between
substance and process ....
The problem lies in basic questions about the
functioning of the adjudicative process" (p. 104). The courts simply do not
possess the resources to perform even the relatively more limited supervisory
role Fischel conceives for them:
Even if the regulatory process is highly flawed (and it is), the severe
problems in the market and the adjudicative process may mean that
the corrupt, excessive, and repressive regulatory process is the best
of bad alternatives. In a quintessential example of the ironies
of comparative institutional analysis, it may even be the best friend
the Lucases of the world have. (P. 106)
This conclusion may appear surprising at first reading, but it is not
inconsistent with Fischel's findings, and it is supported by a good deal of
other evidence that the political process, at least at higher levels of
government, can substantially protect property rights. For example, Fischel
(1995, 140) notes that the United States ranks at the top of international
comparisons of security of property rights, despite the rise of the welfare
state, with its increasing limitations on land uses, and limited judicial
review of government economic regulation since the decline of the
Lochner era. In addition, as I have previously discussed in an analogous
context (Cole 2002, 159-60), national and state governments have passed
legislation specifically designed to protect property rights against regulatory
takings. In Britain, where property rights are not constitutionally protected,
Parliament can lawfully take private property, physically or by regulation,
without having to pay compensation. Yet, Parliament regularly pays
compensation for physical (but not regulatory) takings pursuant to takings
legislation it has enacted. Similarly, in this country, states including Florida
and Texas have recently enacted fairly radical regulatory takings statutes
that provide just compensation even for relatively minor regulatory impositions on private property rights. These laws provide substantially greater
protection than current Supreme Court doctrine for private landowners.
Such legislation is difficult to reconcile with Justice Scalia's severe distrust
of the political process. To the contrary, takings legislation is fully
consistent with Fischel's more optimistic assessment that the political
process itself can be as, or more, effective in protecting (sometimes to the
point of overprotecting) private property rights than the courts.1 3 So, when
Komesar concludes that the David Lucases of the world are better off relying
on malfunctioning political processes than the imperfect and resourceconstrained courts, he may be right, and for more reasons that he recognizes.
13. Whether Komesar would agree is not clear. He seems to distrust legislatures at least
as much as Justice Holmes did, though not as much, perhaps, as Justice Scalia does.
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In any event, on Komesar's analysis, the David Lucases of the world really
have little choice but to rely on the political process. The courts could not
do much to help, even if they wanted to.

HOW MUCH JUDICIAL ACTIVISM? HOW MUCH
JUDICIAL ACTIVITY?
At this point, one might be tempted to throw up one's hands in
despair. If the courts are incapable of fulfilling their constitutionally
appointed role, then what hope is there for the long-run protection of
property rights in the republic? Fischel offers one answer to this question: In
many circumstances, particularly in larger jurisdictions, property rights are
reasonably well protected by the political process itself, so that minimal
judicial oversight is probably sufficient. As already noted, Komesar does not
trust the political process as much as Fischel does. 14 But he, too, seems to
feel that the supply-side and other constraints on the judiciary's ability to
police government regulators are not fatal to property rights in America.
There are, he suggests, "real answers" to complex social problems, such as
those relating to land use, zoning, and regulatory takings; and those answers
are provided by comparative institutional analysis (p. 113). The fact that
the answers Komesar derives are unlikely to please many property-rights
activists, or lawyers for that matter, does not mean he is wrong.
To restate the situation, when dealing with land use issues, we are "in a
world of high numbers and complexity" (p. 116). We have, in essence, three
alternative strategies for dealing with such issues:
Option 1. We could enforce very strong property rights by prohibiting
any regulatory impositions on them, such as zoning. Anyone who does not
like the way a neighbor is utilizing her land would have recourse only to a
market-based solution-that is, they could buy the neighbor's property in a
voluntary, free-market exchange. This solution would involve a high level
of judicial activism, but limited judicial activity, as Komesar defines those
terms. The level of judicial activism depends on the extent to which the
court allows politics to play a role in organizing social relations. When the
court enforces strong property rights and denies any political role in
organizing social relations, that constitutes a high level of judicial activism.
That does not necessarily mean, however, that the court is engaged in a
high level of judicial activity. The level of judicial activity is determined

14. This comparative distrust of the democratic process depends on the level of
government, however. Komesar certainly distrusts state and federal government more than
Fischel does; but he seems to have more faith in the decisions of local zoning boards than
Fischel does. It is tempting to suppose that Fischel's relative distrust of local decision making
might stem from his personal experience serving on a local zoning board.
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by the number of cases the courts must resolve to enforce the law. A
bright-line rule, such as a complete prohibition on zoning, would both
enable and require neighbors to organize their activities and relationships
without recourse to the courts (p. 116). Thus, the complete prohibition on
zoning would likely entail a low level of judicial activity, even though it
involves a high level of judicial activism.
Option 2. Combine relatively weak property rights, subject to a good
deal of political and regulatory control, with substantial judicial oversight to
ensure that those regulations do not, in Justice Holmes's famous expression,
"go too far" (Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415). This solution involves
relatively low judicial activism-again, where judicial activism is defined in
terms of legal limitations on the political process-but frequent judicial
activity, as the courts must decide, case by case, which regulations are
legitimate without compensation and which constitute compensable regulatory takings (p. 116).
Option 3. Combine low judicial activism with limited judicial activity
by combining relatively weak property rights with even more limited, and
therefore less frequent, judicial oversight of the political process. Instead of
allocating the resolution of all land use conflicts to the market, as with the
first alternative, this alternative would allocate the resolution of nearly all
such conflicts to political institutions.
Based largely on the supply-side constraints faced by the courts,
relative to markets and legislatures, Komesar (p. 116-17), recommends
option 3. He recognizes that it is not a very good solution, but in this world
of high numbers and complexity, all our choices are "far from ideal." So, we
are "left to choose the best of the bads." In his view, the least bad
institutional approach to resolving land use issues would involve "a
significant reduction in both judicial activism and judicial activity." This,
in Komesar's view, "is the best available way of achieving resource
allocation efficiency, protection of property, and protection of the interests
of low-and moderate-income families."
Komesar suggests that his preferred option is closer to the status quo
than either of the other alternatives (p. 117). But that is not clear.
Arguably, option 2 most closely approximates the status quo of regulatory
takings law. The case that best represents the current state of the law is Penn
Central Transportationv. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978),15 in which
the Supreme Court announced its intention to base regulatory takings
decisions on "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" into the economic
impact of the regulation on the affected property, the extent of regulatory

15. That Penn Central remains the touchstone of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence
was recently confirmed in Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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interference with "distinct investment-backed expectations," and the
"character of the government action." This is precisely the type of inquiry
that Komesar suggests overburdens the courts. In terms of Komesar's three
options for dealing with regulatory takings cases, Penn Central exemplifies
option 2: weak property rights, subject to substantial government regulation, but protected by the courts on a case-by-case basis. A move to
Komesar's preferred option 3 would likely require the throwing over of
Penn Central in favor of an even less restrictive model for deciding
regulatory takings cases, based perhaps on the Supreme Court's 1987
decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 489 U.S. 470
(1987). In that case, the Court effectively cabined the activist Pennsylvania
Coal ruling, and required little in the way of justification for police-power
regulations of private land uses. Making Keystone the touchstone of
regulatory takings law would require a substantial retreat from current
takings jurisprudence.
In addition, as Komesar himself recognizes (p. 117), his preferred
solution would require the Supreme Court to repudiate or at least substantially restrict judicial review in so-called exaction cases. 16 Together, the
Court's rulings in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), imposed justcompensation requirements for government exactions-dedications of private lands to public uses in exchange for building or other land use
permissions-unless those exactions were substantially related to a legitimate
governmental interest and roughly proportional to the public harm resulting
from the individual development activity for which the permit was sought.
But, Komesar notes, this kind of intensive judicial policing of government
land use regulation is unnecessary to protect private property rights and places
great strain on the strictly limited supply of judicial resources.
Komesar observes, with substantial empirical support (see, e.g., Been
1991), that the market for exactions operates effectively. "[C]ompetition
among local zoning jurisdictions for these exactions should control both
excessive exaction and excessive regulation" (p. 117).17 Thus, judicial
supervision of exactions should be unnecessary. Indeed, to the extent there
is no failure in the exactions market, judicial interference in that market
would of necessity be inefficient.
Komesar considers another possible approach to resolving exaction
cases: complete deregulation. Instead of allocating to the government the
initial entitlement to prohibit building without proper permits, which
provides the government with leverage for obtaining exactions in the first
16. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
17. Komesar's view of exactions is generally consistent with Fischel's (1995, chap. 8)
assessment of how the possibility of exit-removal of property to some other jurisdictiondisciplines governmental excess.
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place, we could select Komesar's option 1, which combines high judicial
activism with low judicial activity. Courts utilizing this approach would
deny the government any authority over what people do with their land;
would-be developers would require no permits, so that the government
would have no leverage to exact concessions of land. Komesar recognizes, of
course, that this would not prevent the government from obtaining
exactions by eminent domain. But that's precisely where the problem lies
for this alternative solution: If the government were forced to resort to
eminent domain to obtain exactions, that would remove exactions from the
competitive market that presently exists. Instead of market pricing, exactions by eminent domain would be priced in the courts, which is likely to be
much less efficient. "Paradoxically," Komesar concludes, "a stronger market
is produced by initially allocating rights [to regulate development] to the
government" (p. 118).
Komesar also notes that the deregulatory solution would likely not
work (p. 118). For reasons discussed earlier in the context of the Mount
Laurel cases, the public-majoritarians-would probably rebel against
judicial activism that overly restricted public regulation of private land
uses. And the courts would find it very difficult to resist the political
backlash; they would likely abandon option 1 for one of the other two
alternatives. Consequently, Komesar concludes, under "quite plausible
assumptions about institutional choice, private property owners are better
protected with reduced rather than increased property rights. The result may
be the most efficient and most equitable for society as a whole and may
produce the largest supply of housing. Protection from governmental
excesses can be provided by competition among the local governments
rather than by rights or courts" (p. 119).

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPERTY THEORY AND THE
RULE OF LAW
In chapter 7 of Law's Limits, Komesar explores some broader implications for property-regime choice, which he believes stem from his comparative institutional analysis of land use planning and regulatory takings law.
According to conventional economic theories of property rights
associated with scholars such as Harold Demsetz (1967) and Robert
Ellickson (1993), private property systems emerge in order to minimize
the transaction costs and externalities associated with resource scarcity
when the rate of demand is increasing. 18 By instituting private property, a
society (or community) can avert what the biologist Garrett Hardin (1968)
18. In Ellickson's (1993, 1326) theory, private property systems also minimize deadweight losses stemming from failures to exploit potential gains from trade.
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called, "the tragedy of the commons," which arises as scarce resources are
depleted and degraded by overuse. A private ownership regime controls
access and prevents overuse of scarce resources by granting one person (or a
small group) an enforceable right to exclude others. Komesar accepts at face
value this argument in favor of individual, private property, concluding that
"alternative systems of common or collective property seriously disintegrate
and true tragedies of the commons show up," as numbers and complexity
increase (p. 131). This is not always the case, however. The burgeoning
literature on common property regimes demonstrates that they sometimes
succeed in conserving scarce resources in the face of rising demand (see, for
example, Bromley 1992; Stevenson 1991; Cole 2002, chap. 6). Komesar
may be right that all such systems can be expected to degrade as numbers
and complexity (including heterogeneity of uses) increases, but we should
not underestimate the size of feasible common-property regimes. Ostrom
(1991, 188), for example, notes that complex common-property agricultural
irrigation systems, with roots in the 15th century or before, continue to
operate successfully today in Spanish huertas that include as many as 13,500
irrigators.
Komesar himself questions "the case for private property," noting that
it becomes "increasingly more difficult to make as numbers and complexity
increase because the simple virtues of parcelization and participation
through monitoring are more difficult to establish and describe" (pp. 94,
104). In other words, private property rights are costly to define and
up with hybrid
allocate-sometimes too costly. As a consequence, we wind
19
systems.
property
various
of
systems combining features
At high numbers and complexity, the modes of organizing production
in private property systems, such as corporations, partnerships, and
complex contractual arrangements, must often employ coordinating,
cooperating, and ordering strategies that bring "common ownership"
attributes into the system. (p. 131)
Komesar stresses that this does not constitute an attack on the preferability
of private property systems in circumstances of high numbers and complexity. He strongly suspects that whatever the deficiencies of private property
systems under such conditions, they would likely outperform any alternative
property system. But he recognizes that high numbers and complexity make
decisions about property systems-no less than decisions about specific
property rules-more difficult (pp. 131, 133, 135).
This is an important point because it cautions us to avoid knee-jerk
reactions against common, or even public, property regimes based on the
19. This perception is broadly consistent with my own observation (Cole 2002) that
societies do not rely on single-institutional, private-property-based solutions to environmental
problems, but instead rely on multiple and often hybrid property systems.
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presumed preferability, in every circumstance, of private property. Even if
private property is a generally preferable system, Komesar's comparative
institutional approach leaves open the possibility that public or common
property may work as well or better in specific situations. For example, when
exclusion is costly, either for technological or institutional reasons, but
coordination of various uses is easy and inexpensive, it may be more
efficient to manage property in common than individually (see Epstein
1994, 20-22; Cole 2002, 131-35).
The implications of Komesar's analysis are even more significant for
conceptions of the rule of law, most of which ignore institutional constraints on the ability of the law to rule over politics. In large measure,
property rights cannot be protected by law; they depend for their protection
on political processes, however dysfunctional. Most unfortunately, as
Komesar explicitly notes, the rule of law proves to be least helpful when
it matters most. As markets and political institutions malfunction more and
more at higher numbers and complexity, the demand for the rule of law
increases. But the same factors that lead to political and market failureshigh numbers and complexity-also constrain the rule of law from meeting
that demand.
But there is always the temptation to try, which can lead to a cycling
problem. As complexity and numbers increase, each of the institutional
alternatives deteriorates. We try to select the least dysfunctional-that
which suffers the least from diseconomies of scale-among them. But we
grow dissatisfied when that approach does not function well. When markets
fail, the public calls for government regulation. When government regulation
begins to display dysfunctions associated with majoritarian or minoritarian
biases, the public calls for judicial intervention. When that fails to resolve the
problem, especially the problem of majoritarian bias, calls arise for deregulation-a return to the market. And the cycle repeats itself. Today's currently
disfavored alternative becomes tomorrow's preferred choice. As Komesar
notes, cycling itself is unproductive and costly. But, he notes, the only way of
avoiding it is for "judges and other societal decision makers to gain greater
sophistication about institutions and institutional choice" (p. 163).
Above all, they must learn that:
The adjudicative process is both smaller than its institutional
alternatives and less able to expand. As increasing numbers and
complexity continue to increase demand on the courts, courts may do
more in an absolute sense but still be forced to allocate a greater
percentage of issues elsewhere. We can expect sweeping allocation of
responsibility away from the courts to other institutions and, therefore,
more rules of abdication. Under this law of rules, the stability, clarity,
and protection against the excesses of government envisioned by the
Rule of Law cannot come primarily from the courts. (P. 163)
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This is not to say that the courts will be completely disabled from imposing
the rule of law as a constraint on political malfunctions and excesses, "but
the chances are that it can do so on a broad basis for only a short time and
that any long-term role for serious judicial intervention will require
narrowing the band of societal issues allocated to the courts" (p. 164).
Komesar therefore expects the judicial role to "diminish over time...
relative to the activity of larger institutions such as the market and the
political process" (p. 165).
From the point of view of lawyers and others, including Komesar
himself, for whom the rule of law stands as a crucial restraint on unwise
democratic impulses, the outlook is not pleasant. But Komesar is trying to be
realistic when he cautions that any "attempt to define a role for the courts
faces a quandary of increasing proportions: The most serious need for judicial
protection and legal rights will generally occur in those settings in which it is
most difficult to deliver this protection" (p. 165). This constitutes a
significant challenge not only for policymakers, but for legal theorists, such
as Joseph Raz (1979), who depend on courts and judicial review, however
limited, as bulwarks of the rule of law (pp. 165-67). Similarly, Ronald
Dworkin's (1985) account of the rule of law "will remain empty" until he
grapples with the institutional issues Komesar raises (p. 169) in Law's Limits.
The same would be true for any theory of rights that contemplates a central
judicial role in defending them from political manipulation, without considering the courts' ability to fill their assigned role.

CONCLUSION
Neil Komesar ends Law's Limits with a constructive proposal to amend
society's approach to legal education. In addition to teaching about legal
doctrines, such as property, contracts, and torts, professors should also teach
about legal institutions and institutional choice. "Contract law," for example, "is replete with institutional choice ranging from the choice of remedies
to issues about the validity of the contract such as unconscionability and
issues about the allocation of risk by implied terms. In general, every area of
law contains tough institutional choices and most are dominated by them"
(p. 178). If we ignore institutional issues in legal education, we risk missing
out on many of the most important issues relating to law today. This is clear
enough from reading Komesar's book.
Also clear is the need for much more work along the same lines.
Komesar has advanced both the method and the application of comparative
institutional analysis. But he would be the first to admit that a great deal of
room remains for improvement, especially in methodology. Comparative
institutional analysis is still in its infancy. Economists, legal scholars, and
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other social scientists have only just begun modeling and applying this
method. 20 Still, Komesar persuasively argues, it has already become not just
an effective tool of legal analysis but an indispensable tool. We have no
choice but to think differently, in more subtle and complex ways, about the
roles of markets, courts, and legislatures.
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